

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 17 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HCSANNA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. V. IZMIRIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. A. E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. Z. SEINER
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBE YEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. R. d'ORLANDI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V. A. SEMENOV
Mr. I. V. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. M. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. G. TAHCURDIN
Mr. D. N. BRINSON
Mr. R. C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the 145th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Since last Monday's meeting two very important events concerning nuclear tests have taken place which already attracted notice at the Committee's meeting on 12 June (ENDC/PV.143) and regarding which I should like briefly to express the views of the Italian delegation.

First, there was the decision of President Kennedy that the United States would not carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere for so long as other States did not do so (ENDC/95, p.6). In this connexion I should like to recall that because of the very dangerous consequences of radioactive fall-out the Italian delegation, like several other delegations here, long ago expressed support for the immediate cessation at least of tests in the atmosphere pending a complete and controlled agreement on the prohibition of all tests.

My delegation therefore welcomes the gesture of the United States Government with particular satisfaction. President Kennedy's declarations, which have been widely echoed everywhere, have had an inestimable effect in allaying the concern felt throughout the world. My delegation is certain that, after this decision by the United States Government, no other government will wish to take the responsibility of renewing the nuclear test race in the atmosphere.

We hope that the competition between East and West will shift away from the field of armaments towards that of progress and science, in which we note with admiration the exploits of the Soviet cosmonauts, on which I wish sincerely to congratulate the Soviet delegation.

The Italian delegation is not unaware, of course, that the United States Government's decision regarding tests in the atmosphere is not a complete and definitive solution to the problem. Further efforts will be necessary to banish for all time through controlled and reciprocal undertakings, the dangers of tests in all environments. We know that these efforts are to be resumed very shortly on fresh bases, and that is the second important event to which I referred earlier.

My delegation immediately stressed the value of the joint approach made by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to Mr. Khrushchev on 31 May in an effort to break the deadlock in the test ban negotiations and renew them at a higher level. We in Italy have followed the positive unfolding of this move with the greatest interest, and are now very satisfied that it has been favourably received by the Soviet Government.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The spirit in which the West will participate in the Moscow negotiations is already known. The speech made by President Kennedy on 10 June (ENDC/95) is a new, clear and very important indication of it. The favourable response to his words by the Soviet Union inspires reasonable confidence in the success of the Moscow meeting. In any event, the resumption of nuclear negotiations is certainly cause for satisfaction in our Committee, which sees in it a confirmation of the usefulness and effectiveness of its work.

Our appeals for hastening negotiations have not gone unanswered. Furthermore, the Committee's discussions have furnished the Moscow negotiators with useful suggestions and interesting proposals, the most recent of which is the memorandum of the three African countries (ENDC/94).

As the United States representative said during our meeting of 12 June, the efforts made by our Committee will be of great help in the meetings which are to take place in Moscow (ENDC/PV.143, p. 13). I am sure that all of us wish the three negotiating countries the best of success. The Italian delegation in particular wishes to affirm once more its hope that soon the prohibition of all tests, as demanded by all the countries of the world, will be embodied in a fair and effective agreement as a first step on the path to general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In the few remarks I make this morning I should like on behalf of the Canadian delegation to express, as other representatives have done and as our Italian colleague has just done, deep satisfaction at the announced agreement to undertake high-level negotiations in Moscow next month on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We warmly welcome the announcement. We believe that it shows that the three nuclear Powers concerned remain convinced that early agreement to cease nuclear tests is a matter of the highest importance and that they will search for solutions to the problems which have until now prevented the signature of a treaty. The Canadian delegation fully shares the hope so eloquently expressed by the President of the United States in his speech of 10 June (ENDC/95) that the forthcoming negotiations in Moscow will be successful.

As we look forward to the Moscow negotiations I think it would be appropriate to give some thought to how, in the weeks to come, we should deal with the question of a test ban, which of course has been and continues to be a matter of prime concern to this Committee on Disarmament. I would hope that there would be general agreement that we should maintain

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

discordant views, first on the priority of the importance of the measures, and secondly on their scope and their usefulness. I therefore believe we might make better progress in the negotiation of collateral measures if we examined the possibilities of simultaneous agreement on a number of interrelated items. The matters to be included in a broader agreement of that sort would obviously be a matter for negotiation. However, this approach deserves consideration, since a measure which one State or group of states finds it difficult to accept in isolation might well prove meaningful and acceptable if associated with action on some other question in which that State or group of States was particularly interested. In that way a combination of related collateral measures could well offer a prospect of progress in this field.

In closing I should like on behalf of the Canadian delegation to offer congratulations to the Soviet Union, whose scientists and cosmonauts have again demonstrated their great skill and ability in putting a male cosmonaut and a female cosmonaut into orbit. From my reading of the news in the Journal de Genève I was unable to determine whether the male cosmonaut was pursuing the female cosmonaut or vice versa, but perhaps we shall be enlightened on this point by our Soviet colleagues later.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Before coming to my statement, I should like also on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation and myself personally to express our joy and our sincerest congratulations to the Soviet Union in connexion with the latest remarkable success of the Soviet cosmonauts. People all over the world are following with boundless enthusiasm the remarkable heroism of this latest combined space flight of Valery Bykovsky and Valentina Tereshkova, the Soviet man and the Soviet woman -- the first woman cosmonaut in the world -- who, with joint efforts and in co-operation, are carrying out a mission of enormous importance for the destiny of the whole human race. We wish Valery Bykovsky and Valentina Tereshkova -- Falcon and Seagull, as they are called in space -- a successful accomplishment of all their noble tasks and a happy return to their native Earth.

At the meeting our Committee held on 10 June the representative of Ethiopia, acting also on behalf of the delegations of Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, submitted a resolution (ENDC/PV.142, pp.5, 6) on general and complete disarmament adopted by the Conference of Heads of independent African States which took place at Addis Ababa from 22 to 25 May (ENDC/93/Rev.1). The Czechoslovak delegation considers this resolution an important document which can help towards the achievement of the aims and the accomplishment

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

of the tasks before our Committee. The contents of this document express the views of the Heads and political leaders of thirty States, the views of the free African continent, and they should be taken into consideration by the delegations of all the States members of our Committee in formulating and presenting their points of view.

Even before the opening of the Addis Ababa Conference, the Emperor of Ethiopia correctly pointed out that the eyes of the whole world would be upon it. He said:

"To have convened this Conference twenty years ago would have been an inconceivable and unattainable dream because at that time Africa was almost entirely under colonial domination".

Now the new, independent Africa, in the first representative assembly of its political leaders, has been giving very special attention to the problem of disarmament and has thus been taking an important part in the efforts of all peace-loving peoples to avert the threat of a thermonuclear war and to consolidate peace throughout the world. We regard as one of the most significant achievements of that Conference that it has clearly shown the direct connexion and mutual relationship of the struggle for the freedom and independence of the peoples of Africa and the unity of the African countries with the struggle for peace and disarmament.

By their concerted and co-ordinated action on the question of disarmament the political leaders of Africa have shown the way to the political leaders of other continents. We share their view that Africa should become a denuclearized zone, an area in which there will be no nuclear tests in future; where there will be no production or stockpiling of atomic weapons; where there will be no foreign military bases; and where atomic energy will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

We fully associate ourselves with the concrete demands of the leaders of Africa addressed to the Powers concerned, that these Powers should remove any nuclear weapons they may have on African territory and that they should begin negotiations for the elimination of foreign military bases in Africa; "which elimination", as is rightly emphasized in the resolution, "constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity." (ibid.)

The path towards implementation of the resolution of the thirty countries of Africa is clear. It is essential to respect Africa as a denuclearized zone and to assume an obligation never to use nuclear weapons against the countries of Africa; to cease all nuclear weapon tests on African territory; to withdraw all types of nuclear weapons from this area; to eliminate all foreign military bases which are a threat to the security and freedom of the new African States, and to assist the efforts of the African States aimed at ensuring that on that continent atomic energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

We are prepared and will do our utmost to help bring about the fulfilment of these demands of the African countries. In so doing, we shall contribute, in direct accordance with the demands of the progressive African political leaders, towards the cessation of the armaments race, towards the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war and towards the speediest preparation and signature of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We are convinced that the joint efforts of the socialist countries, the independent States of Africa and other non-aligned countries will in the end bear fruit and that the judicious trends expressed in President Kennedy's recent statement (ENDC/95) will triumph in all the Western countries.

In the next part of my statement today I should like to state briefly the views of the Czechoslovak delegation on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

I venture to assure the Committee that public opinion in Czechoslovakia has noted with great satisfaction the recent agreement between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to begin in the middle of July this year in Moscow high-level negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. We also see in this decision a serious attempt on the part of the nuclear Powers to clear away all the remaining obstacles which have so far prevented agreement on this most important problem.

We all realize that the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests would lead to a general improvement of the atmosphere in international relations and would open the way to the solution of other important problems, particularly the question of disarmament.

We believe that there should be no insuperable obstacles standing in the way to the achievement of final agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. On the contrary, everything now speaks in favour of an immediate conclusion of such an agreement. The development of science and technology, which is making progress with giant strides, has fully confirmed the views of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States that at the present time the existing networks of national detection systems are fully adequate for the detection and identification of all types of nuclear test explosions, including those underground.

As for nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, at high altitudes and under water, complete unanimity of opinion has already been reached on the possibility of effectively detecting these explosions through the use of national means of detection. The Western Powers, however, continue stubbornly to maintain their old position in regard to underground nuclear tests, alleging that these explosions, particularly explosions of low yield, are difficult to distinguish from natural seismic events.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

I do not intend to repeat today the well-known facts which show the negative position of the Western Powers, which, without any scientific or technical grounds for doing so, are preventing the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

No offence to the delegations of the NATO countries is meant, but the fact that the Governments of the United States and France have ignored the appeal of the United Nations to put an end to all nuclear tests after 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762 (XVII) - ENDC/63) and that these countries are continuing such tests, is anything but proof of their good will and desire to contribute in every way towards the achievement of an agreement.

During the past weeks and months, in the course of negotiations on this question both here in the Committee and in the forum of the United Nations, the delegations of the socialist countries have put forward a number of convincing arguments showing how prominent scientists and political leaders as well as various organizations and institutions in the West, particularly in the United States, have repeatedly confirmed the correctness of the position of the socialist countries, that national means are fully adequate for the detection and identification of all kinds of nuclear tests. The agreement of the Soviet Union to have a limited number of automatic seismic stations (ENDC/PV.90, p.15) is a reliable guarantee that possible violations would not go undetected.

At our meeting on 10 June, the Soviet representative again recalled a number of convincing statements made by Western leaders, in particular United States political leaders, scientists and specialized institutions, which confirmed this fact. (ENDC/PV.142, pp. 24 et seq.).

I should like to recall once again at least the views of nine prominent United States scientists in the field of nuclear research in a statement contained in document ENDC/85. They all expressed themselves in favour of the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and proved that the apprehensions concerning the possibility of clandestine underground nuclear weapons test are without any foundation. They stated:

"Even though a single small test might be concealed by being confused with an earthquake if the test were conducted in a region of frequent earthquake occurrences, any significant series of tests would be almost impossible to conceal." (ENDC/85, p.3)

In this connexion, I should like to quote yet another statement. I intend to quote the words of a leading article of The Times of London of 11 June 1963, which, in connexion with the problem of detecting nuclear tests, frankly states that:

(continued in English)

"The Russians have most of the scientists on their side when they say that inspections are not vital".

(continued in Russian)

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Further, the author of this leading article comes to the extremely important conclusion that:

(continued in English)

"The West has weakened its case by insisting on the scientific need for inspections when its real motives have been political ...".

(continued in Russian)

I should like to stress the word "political". As we see, even such an important British source as The Times confirms the position of the socialist countries, that the problem of the cessation of tests has long ceased to be a scientific and technical problem and that it is primarily a political problem, a question of the presence or absence of the good will to achieve an agreement.

In the first place, however, it is essential that the Western Powers should at last abandon all attempts to impose their demands, which are aimed at acquiring unilateral advantages and opening up for the Western Powers an opportunity to carry out activities likely to jeopardize the security and defence capability of States.

Truly, the time has come to reach a final agreement on the cessation of tests. The forthcoming Moscow negotiations may be a significant milestone in this respect. That is why we should like to believe that the actions of the United States delegation will reflect the realistic words spoken by President Kennedy in his statement of 10 June when he said that the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of tests "... would increase our security -- it would decrease the prospects of war" (ENDC/95, p.6) and that the United States would therefore persevere in striving to achieve this goal.

If, on the part of the delegations of the Western Powers, there is as much good will and readiness to achieve an agreement as there is on the part of the Soviet Union, the forthcoming negotiations of the representatives of the three nuclear Powers on the cessation of the tests may lead to positive results and open the way to achieving progress also on other important questions with which our negotiations are concerned. It seems to me there is no need to recall what a warm response this would meet with among the peoples of the world.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I have asked to speak briefly for two purposes. First, my delegation would like to add its sincere congratulations to those of other delegations to the Soviet delegation, and through it to the Soviet Government and people, on the feat achieved by the Soviet Union in again placing two astronauts in orbit at the same time. We extend our congratulations and our best wishes to Lieutenant Colonel Valery Bykovsky and to the first lady of space, Lieutenant Valentina Tereshkova. We wish them every success and happy landings.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Second, my delegation would like to propose that, after we have concluded the normal business of this meeting, and when there are no further speakers on the topic for this morning, the Committee should go into informal meeting, without verbatim records or verbatim reporters, in order to discuss certain matters relating to the procedure of our Conference.

Mr. MACCVESCU (Romania): On behalf of the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic I want warmly to congratulate the Soviet delegation on the outstanding achievement of the astronauts Valery Bykovsky and Valentina Tereshkova, whose flight represents a new link in the efforts of Soviet science and technology in the service of man. We wish them all success in fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them by the Soviet Government, as we wish them also a happy and glorious landing.

Witnessing the new achievement of Soviet science and of Soviet astronauts, Man -- with a capital "M", as Maxim Gorky put it -- feels prouder, stronger and more confident in his ability to overcome the obstacles which nature has been and is always putting in his way. This new space flight is telling evidence of the speed with which science and technology are moving on at present, conquering all difficulties and making possible what only a short time ago still seemed to be a Utopian dream. The rapidity characterizing the evolution of science and technology is a general feature of our era and it testifies to the correctness of the stand of those delegations here that assert, as indeed they have persistently asserted all through our proceedings that, as far as the practical and technical background of a test ban treaty is concerned, we may confidently take as a starting point the ever growing possibilities of detecting, locating identifying all nuclear explosions by means of national systems and automatic seismological stations. That is an element not to be overlooked when we state -- as indeed has often been stated before by many delegations, including the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic -- that:

"... never in the already long history of the negotiations have the two parties come closer to each other" (ENDC/PV.145, p.11)

I do not intend at this juncture to go once more into the details of the issue. I should like only to stress that today nobody can deny that what is practically needed for the conclusion and implementation of a test ban treaty is -- besides the real interest of all parties concerned to halt such tests once and for all -- first, to ensure such a verification system as would prevent any government that might contemplate evading the test ban from carrying out a series of significant tests without risking detection; second,

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

that the existing network of national seismological stations -- which can be developed still further with relative ease -- now at the disposal of the Western side, to which are to be added three automatic seismological stations situated on the territory of the Soviet Union and three others situated in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union along its frontiers, are of such a nature as to give such assurance; and, finally, that the alternative -- the continuance of the now obtaining situation of a nuclear arms race in full blast -- is incomparably more menacing to the welfare of mankind and to international peace and security than the possible risk to guard against which on-site inspections are being asked for.

Those are thoughts which, we are glad to note, are gaining ground even among leading authorities in the United States, although we are aware, much to our regret, that they have not yet inspired the Western delegations here to any degree. Therefore it is with interest that I read in the statement made as recently as 10 June by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, the following words which I beg permission to quote in concluding my intervention:

"No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can -- if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers -- offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race." (ENDC/95, p.7)

Let me express the hope that the Moscow negotiations will proceed in a realistic spirit and take inspiration from the firm desire to reach -- on the basis of realities -- a test ban agreement, an agreement so ardently desired by the peoples the world over, including the Romanian people.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I should like to begin by expressing my thanks to the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, to the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Simovic, to the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, to the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, and to all the other representatives who have spoken not at the meeting but privately, for their warm words of congratulation on the new combined flight of the Soviet cosmonauts, Valery Bykovsky and Valentina Tereshkova, and for their good wishes for the success of their mission. It goes without saying that we are certainly proud of this new achievement of Soviet science in the field of the exploration and conquest of outer space, which opens up new horizons for the further

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

penetration of man into the cosmos. But this is not a purely national achievement. These achievements belong to all the peoples of the world, because they help forward the progress of all mankind. The fact that in this cosmic flight a Soviet woman is taking part for the first time in history is of profound significance to all mankind. This fact in itself shows, in the first place, the true equality of rights between woman and man and, secondly, woman's equivalence to man in any situation, in any sphere of human activity.

This new combined flight of the Soviet cosmonauts is an outstanding example of the peaceful conquest of outer space for the benefit of all people. In order to preclude any possibility of outer space being used for military purposes, it is necessary to achieve general and complete disarmament as soon as possible. We urge our colleagues here in the Committee to redouble their efforts to achieve this great aim.

At today's meeting, as well as at the meeting on 10 June (ENDC/PV.142) we have heard a number of speakers emphasize in their statements the urgency of the problem of putting an end to nuclear weapon tests. Some of them noted that technical, military and economic considerations, as well as the existing circumstances, are now propitious for the immediate conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. All this, of course, is correct, and we fully share the anxiety and deep concern in regard to the most unsatisfactory situation which has come about in our negotiations. The impatience and obvious dissatisfaction in the world with such long delays in the negotiations for an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests for all time are perfectly legitimate and justified. In particular, there can be no justification for any further delay in coming to agreement on this fairly simple question in these days when, as the United States Senator, Mr. Humphrey, said, the results achieved in the field of the detection of underground nuclear explosions "are phenomenal" (ENDC/82, p.24).

This fact in itself shows that control over compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests can be carried out by national means for the detection of nuclear explosions and that there is no need for international control, including on-site inspection. The whole peculiarity of the situation created in connexion with this demand of the Western Powers is that the foreign inspection teams, which the Western Powers insist they should have the right to send into the Soviet Union, would, from the standpoint of their official functions, do nothing more than carry out expeditions inside the territory of the Soviet Union merely in order to formulate the conclusion, after on-site verification, that the event concerned was a natural earthquake, because in the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Soviet Union nuclear weapons have not been tested underground before the signing of an agreement on this question, and for all the more reason they will not be so tested after the signing of an agreement. The Soviet Union will faithfully comply with its obligation in regard to the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests for ever. These on-site inspections, these expeditions inside the Soviet Union for the purpose of control over nuclear explosions, are quite unnecessary. With the further development of the methods and technique of identifying seismic events, underground nuclear explosions are easily detected from great distances by national means of detection.

Enough has already been written about this in the world Press and many statements in this regard have been made by various prominent scientists in the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and other countries. I made a brief summary of these statements at our meeting last Monday, 10 June (ENDC/PV.142), and therefore I do not intend to repeat this information. The odd thing about the position of the Western Powers is that the processes going on in the world about us, in life, have no influence upon it and are not reflected in it. As a result of this, a very peculiar and even amazing situation has come about in regard to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Time is bringing more and more evidence and proof of the effectiveness of national means for the detection of underground nuclear explosions. One would think that the Western Powers ought to take this into consideration and drop their demand for inspection. But in fact just the opposite is happening. The grounds for inspection are disappearing, but the demands for inspection are becoming more and more insistent. These demands of the Western Powers have not been dropped even now when there remain neither any scientific and technical grounds nor any military reasons for putting them forward.

For five years the position of the Western Powers on the question of inspection has not undergone any basic change. They continue to insist on inspection, yet life has all the time been going forward and has brought more and more corrections to the original rough drafts concerning the form of control over compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Let us recall that at the outset -- 1958, five years ago -- we were talking about international forms of control over compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, including on-site inspection. However, miraculous, one can say, really fabulous progress in science and technology nowadays has given a powerful impetus to the development of methods of identifying seismic events and methods of detecting nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In 1961 already the advances in this field became so impressive, so convincing, that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom were compelled to admit officially the effectiveness of national means of control and in the same year, 1961, they themselves put forward a proposal (GEN/DNT/110 - ENDC/9) for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and at high altitudes, in outer space, without the establishment of any international control whatsoever, and without any inspection. With regard to underground explosions, however, they made an exception and continued to insist on international control and on inspection for control over these explosions.

For the Western Powers the demand for international control in regard to underground nuclear explosions was merely a peg, a pretext in order to secure for themselves wide opportunities, legalized by an international agreement, for carrying out intelligence activities on the territory of the Soviet Union. This indeed is what lies at the root of the demand for international control and inspection which is being put forward by the Western Powers. Therefore we must note that the representatives of the Western Powers, contradicting the opinion expressed by their own scientists regarding the effectiveness of national means for the detection of underground nuclear explosions, continue to insist on inspection, while disregarding or, rather, ignoring the developments which are taking place in this respect in actual life. Meanwhile, brilliant successes have been achieved in the invention of new and the improvement of existing instruments, mechanisms and apparatus with the most precise sensitivity and unprecedented high selectivity.

In recent years, a good many reports have been published on these advances in the field of seismology which show that nowadays national means for the detection of nuclear explosions are fully adequate for the purposes of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and that there is no need to carry out foreign on-site inspections. It should also be taken into account that the actual advances in this field are even greater, even more significant than what has been published in the Press regarding them, because a good deal in this field, which is closely connected with the development of nuclear weapons, is secret information and is not published.

We have already referred here on many occasions to the statement made by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, who on 11 March last in the course of a hearing in the United States Senate said that the results achieved in the field of the United States' capabilities of detecting nuclear explosions were greater than could be revealed in public (ENDC/PV.119, p.9).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We, the Soviet Union, taking into account these facts, do not demand the carrying out of inspection on the territories of the United States and other Western Powers. In this respect we, the Soviet Union, rely on our national means for the detection of underground nuclear explosions. The same is true also in respect of the Western Powers. They can and should rely on their own, that is, on national means for the detection of underground nuclear explosions and should not demand the right to send foreign inspection teams inside the Soviet Union.

The whole difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that an attempt is being made to replace the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests with the question of inspection. The Western Powers continue to link an agreement on this question to, and make it dependent on, the consent of the other side to allow on-site inspection when there is now no need for this. At the present time the demand for inspection is being put forward in the interests of the Pentagon, the central intelligence agency of the United States and the NATO military staffs, who obviously feel a definite need to get more accurate information on the targets in the Soviet Union for nuclear bombardments. This question now affects to a considerable extent the security of the Soviet State and this should be taken into account by all who show a sincere desire to ensure the earliest conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

To sum up, the situation in this regard has become quite clear. The ways for solving it on a realistic, mutually-acceptable and equal basis are clear; our task at present is to prevent this simple issue becoming complicated and confused.

An agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests for ever can be signed without delay. Control over compliance with this agreement can be fully ensured by national means for the detection of underground nuclear explosions. In addition, a limited number of automatic seismic stations can be used. All this represents a reliable guarantee for the purpose of discovering any possible attempt to violate an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Here we have the basis for an agreement on this question, the basis which enables us to conclude an agreement immediately. We are ready to sign such an agreement. It is now up to the Western Powers.

Mr. LALL (India): Our delegation would like to join in the congratulations to the Soviet delegation and to the people and Government of the Soviet Union on this occasion of another brilliant success in cosmology. Nothing we can say in words would adequately express our admiration for what science is doing in various parts of the world, and particularly in this latest brilliant achievement.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Some representatives have quite rightly made this the starting point of remarks on the relevance of scientific progress in the issue which we are discussing today in accordance with our normal programme, namely the issue of a much needed and urgently required ban on all forms of nuclear testing. It seems to us that of course scientific advance and technological advances must be taken into account. We assume that therefore it would be agreed that any arrangements which would be entered into in connexion with the cessation of all nuclear tests -- and we hope such arrangements are now definitely going to be made at the forthcoming Moscow discussions -- would naturally include provisions to review periodically or by mutual agreement whatever system is incorporated in the agreement for verification procedures to ensure that no testing is taking place.

Such periodical review would obviously be required in a world in which technology and science are moving ahead, but it seems to us that it would be extremely difficult to arrive at agreements in any conversations which might be held in the near future if there was any retreat from the positions of maximum effort towards agreement so far put forward by the two sides: that is to say, there should be no going back on the furthest steps taken by both sides towards reaching agreement, otherwise we shall be undoing the process of negotiation as it has developed over the years.

If it is said, for example, that inspection for a test ban would take place in advance of any factual disarmament, then it would seem to us that one practical course would be not to delay a test ban based on the maximum concessions so far made by both sides, but to make such a test ban the basis of agreement on disarmament measures and to do so urgently so that the first steps of disarmament could be put into effect quickly.

We have been discussing general and complete disarmament here since March 1962. Many issues have been clarified. Underlying all the words that have been spoken there certainly are currents which could be the basis of a confluence of ideas and which would result in certain positive and tangible steps of disarmament. Therefore, we believe that there should be no going back in any respect, either in our disarmament negotiations or in our test ban negotiations, from the maximum effort which has so far been put forward -- that that maximum effort should be made the basis of an increased momentum which will lead to positive disarmament steps and which will put an end to any fear which any side might have that verification measures will exist in a vacuum without any disarmament to follow suit.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): With the Committee's permission I should like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of Mexico.

(The Chairman, Mexico)

I wish to add the congratulations of my delegation to those extended by the representatives who spoke before me on the new and daring flight of the two Soviet cosmonauts. As the Soviet representative said, what is remarkable about the event is that for the first time a Soviet woman has taken part in this kind of flight, a fact which will no doubt strengthen legitimate aspirations, and consolidate what has been achieved, in the matter of the equality of rights and opportunity for men and women all over the world. These technical and scientific advances in the exploration of outer space give us greater proof every day of the remarkable power of the human mind when aided by the resources of science and technology.

The representative of Romania, quoting a few words of Gorki, said (supra, p.13) that this showed that there are men with a capital "M". I believe that at the present time political science has fallen far behind the conquests of scientists in other fields, and especially in that of the exploration of outer space.

It is our wish and hope that the statesmen of today, the heads of governments and particularly those with a special responsibility for maintaining world peace, are also statesmen with a capital "S" and that they will demonstrate their ability in the new attempt which is to take place in Moscow by reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests which, in addition to signifying an important step forward toward the betterment of the present international situation and the reduction of existing tension, should also make it possible to carry on constructive work with the object of achieving general and complete disarmament.

My delegation wishes every success to the Soviet cosmonauts. We hope that they will satisfactorily carry out the task assigned them and that they will return to their country in perfect health and with the joy of having accomplished a great mission which not only signifies a triumph for Soviet science but also, as Mr. Tsarapkin so aptly said (supra, p.15), a triumph for all mankind.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil) (translation from Spanish): I wish to make a very brief statement expressing only a few words of enthusiasm. On behalf of the Brazilian delegation, and therefore of the people and Government of Brazil, I warmly congratulate the people and the Government of the Soviet Union for the extraordinary feat which Soviet science and technology have just accomplished for the benefit of human knowledge and, hence, for the benefit of mankind itself.

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

I wish to stress that the Government of Brazil, which strenuously opposes the evil use of science and technology for the destruction of human life, views with enthusiasm and emotion the positive results of science used for the benefit of mankind and wishes to participate in them.

The conquest of outer space and a deeper insight into the reality of our world may correct the false ideas we formerly had and still have in many fields of human knowledge which seriously prejudice a broad, intelligent and realistic view of the world. In this way we might be able to use science exclusively and positively to our benefit. By correcting these errors, we would be in a better position to realise for mankind those utopias and dreams which are now becoming reality and within the grasp of man by virtue of his imagination and creativity.

All these events deserve and receive the sincere applause of the Government and people of Brazil.

I wish to convey through the Soviet delegation our warmest greetings to Colonel Bykovsky and to the cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova, for their extraordinary feat and to express my sincerest hope that their exploit will end happily, that they will return to earth richer in experience and that the earth will benefit from the results obtained.

We also hope that the landing of this bird from outer space will take place successfully, for the benefit of all mankind.

Mr. THURDIN (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom delegation fully associates itself with the congratulations expressed this morning by other speakers on the remarkable feat achieved by the Soviet Union in again placing two cosmonauts in orbit. That exploit will be all the more memorable in that the world today salutes the first flight of a woman cosmonaut. May we also wish them both "happy landings"?

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forty-fifth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, the representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Romania, the Soviet Union, India, Mexico, Brazil and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 19 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.